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Trademark Boundaries: The Geography
of Non-Conventional Marks
Constance R. Lindman, Esq.*
SUMMARY
This article addresses the use and protection of non-conventional trade-
marks; in particular, the basis for protection of non-conventional trademarks
in the United States. Non-conventional trademarks include visually percepti-
ble marks such as color and product shape, and non-visually perceptible
marks including sound, scent, and texture marks. This article further dis-
cusses the critical role of secondary meaning in establishing rights in non-
conventional marks. Finally, this article considers the effect of consumer his-
tory and geography on establishing secondary meaning in non-conventional
marks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s modern consumers would easily recognize the earliest marks
adopted in the eastern and western worlds as trademarks. During China’s
Song Dynasty in the 13th Century, symbols were applied to porcelain and
other goods to identify their maker.1 Around the same time in Italy, paper
producers began applying designs known as “watermarks” to identify their
origin from a particular papermaker or trade guild.2 These early trademarks,
just like today’s marks, were associated with the quality of the marked goods
and came to denote good will.3
While conventional marks comprised of letters, numbers, or designs (or
some combination of these) still dominate the trademark universe, the variety
of “signs” or “devices” protectable as trademarks in much of the world has
expanded in a manner that would be unrecognizable to purchasers of
dishware in China or paper in Italy nine centuries ago. Non-conventional
trademarks encountered by modern consumers may include visible signs
such as colors, shapes, and moving images, as well as non-visible signs in-
cluding sounds, scents, tastes, and textures. Examples include the blue color
* Adjunct Professor at Robert H. McKinney School of Law at Indiana
University.
1. Charles L. Miller II, A Cultural and Historical Perspective to Trademark Law
Enforcement in China, BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 114 (2004).
2. Water Marks, MCKINNEY ENG’G LIBRARY, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/engin/
trademark/timeline/ren/watermarks.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
3. See Miller, supra note 1, at 115 n.56; see also The Renaissance of Trademarks,
MCKINNEY ENG’G LIBRARY, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/engin/trademark/time
line/ren/ren.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
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of a robin’s egg,4 the shape of a bottle,5 the sound of a lion’s roar,6 the scent
of bubble gum,7 and the texture of velvet.8
II. CONVENTIONAL TRADEMARKS AND THE SPECTRUM
OF DISTINCTIVENESS
The United States has extended trademark protection to product shapes
for over fifty years. Indeed, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) granted a trademark registration for the Coca-Cola bottle shape in
1960.9 Companies doing business in the United States have continued to
push the boundaries of trademark protection in recent decades to include
visually perceptible marks (colors, holograms, moving images) and non-visu-
ally perceptible marks (sound, scent, texture). But, more than a vivid imagi-
nation is required to protect non-conventional trademarks in the United
States. Non-conventional marks must perform the same function as conven-
4. The drawing is lined for the color blue, and color is a feature of the mark. The
drawing of the box is outlined in dotted lines. The mark consists of a shade of
blue often referred to as robin’s egg blue, which is used on catalog covers,
TIFFANY AND COMPANY, Registration No. 2416794; the mark consists of a
shade of blue often referred to as robin’s egg blue, which is used on bags,
TIFFANY AND COMPANY, Registration No. 2416795; the mark consists of a
shade of blue often referred to as robin’s egg blue, which is used on boxes,
TIFFANY AND COMPANY, Registration No. 2359351; and the mark consists of
the color blue as applied to the top face of a fastener, where the diameter of the
blue circle is about one half the diameter of the face of the fastener, TIFFANY
AND COMPANY, Registration No. 4177892.
5. The trademark consists of the distinctively shaped contour, or confirmation,
and design of the bottle as shown, COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0696147; the
mark consists of the three dimensional configuration of the distinctive bottle as
shown, COCA-COLA, Registration No. 1057884. The mark consists of a bottle
design featuring a series of alternating vertical panels on the lower half of the
bottle. One set of panels has a slightly textured surface and features the “Coca-
Cola” trademark, and the other features a surface filled with multiple raised
circular bubbles. A vertical wavy line of varying width separates the two
panels. The dotted outline of the screw top closure and the bottle base are for
positioning only and do not comprise a feature of the mark, COCA-COLA, Re-
gistration No. 3510996.
6. The mark comprises a lion roaring. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, Registration
No. 1395550.
7. The mark consists of the scent of bubble gum, Registration No. 4754435.
8. The mark consists of a velvet textured covering on the surface of a bottle of
wine, Registration No. 3155702 (the registration was subsequently cancelled
for failure to file a declaration of continued use of the mark in commerce).
9. The trademark consists of the distinctively shaped contour, or confirmation,
and design of the bottle as shown, COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0696147.
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tional marks; namely, they must distinguish the owner’s goods or services
from the goods or services of others.
Some signs can never function as trademarks because they will never
serve the critical role of distinguishing the goods or services. For example, a
generic term such as “apple” cannot serve as a trademark for apples because
it can never distinguish the apples of one supplier from the apples of another
supplier. On the other hand, some signs can function as trademarks the in-
stant they are adopted because they immediately function to distinguish the
goods or services. For example, “Xerox” is a fanciful term with no prior
meaning. It is considered a strong mark and, immediately upon being
adopted, it distinguished the owner’s copiers from other copiers. Generic
(unprotectable) signs and fanciful (strong) marks lie at opposite ends of the
trademark spectrum. Most U.S. marks lie in between these two extremes, and
are classified (from strongest to weakest) as arbitrary, suggestive, and de-
scriptive marks.10
Like fanciful marks, arbitrary and suggestive marks serve to distinguish
the owner’s goods immediately upon use. Stated another way, these marks
are inherently distinctive. Arbitrary marks are terms that have an accepted
meaning, however, their meaning is not associated with the goods or ser-
vices. As mentioned above, the term “apple” used in connection with apples
is generic, and cannot be protected. However, the term “apple” as used by
Apple Inc. in connection with computers and mobile phones is an arbitrary
mark. A suggestive mark is a term that is associated with the goods or ser-
vices, but only weakly. A suggestive mark merely alludes to some attribute
of the product, but does not directly describe the product or its features. The
term “Mustang” used as the model of car brings to mind the qualities of a
wild mustang horse such as speed and power, but does not describe a car or
its particular qualities.
In contrast to fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks, descriptive terms
do not automatically function as trademarks. Descriptive terms describe an
ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of the
goods or services.11 Descriptive terms can be protected as trademarks in the
United States, but only if they acquire distinctiveness or “secondary mean-
ing” as an identifier of source.12 For example, the term “national” describes
car rental services that are offered throughout the country or nation, yet “Na-
tional” is entitled to protection as a trademark in the United States for car
rental services because it has developed secondary meaning to the public
10. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
(establishing the distinctiveness spectrum and relative strength of marks, from
fanciful to generic).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012).
12. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
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through long and extensive use by National Car Rental.13 Proof of secondary
meaning is required so that competition is not improperly stifled.14
III. NON-CONVENTIONAL MARKS AND DISTINCTIVENESS
Like conventional signs, in order to function as a mark non-conven-
tional signs must distinguish the goods or services on which they are used
from other goods or services. So, non-conventional signs may be entirely
unprotectable (like generic terms), immediately protectable (like fanciful, ar-
bitrary, and suggestive terms), or protectable only after acquiring secondary
meaning (like descriptive terms).
Functional aspects of a product or service are treated the same as ge-
neric terms; they are not capable of distinguishing the producer’s goods or
services and therefore cannot be protected.15 For example, a loud alarm con-
sisting of alternating pulses was found to be functional for personal security
alarms because a loud alarm was essential to the use or purpose of security
alarms, and alternating pulses were more effective than a steady sound.16
Harley Davidson’s attempt to register “the exhaust sound of applicant’s
motorcycles, produced by V-twin, common crankpin motorcycle engines
when the goods are in use” was strongly opposed by Kawasaki and Honda,
who argued that the sound was purely functional because it was nothing
more or less than that produced by any engine of that type.17
A product’s colors and shape are treated like descriptive terms; they can
only be protected upon showing that they have become distinctive by devel-
oping secondary meaning.18 Other types of non-conventional signs, including
sounds and textures, may be either immediately distinctive (such as fanciful,
arbitrary, and suggestive conventional marks) or require proof of secondary
meaning (such as descriptive conventional marks). But, non-conventional
marks are seldom found to be inherently distinctive, thus their owners would
be wise to anticipate a need to show proof of secondary meaning.
13. NATIONAL CAR RENTAL, Registration No. 1540913.
14. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
15. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
16. See In re Vertex Grp. L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1694 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
17. Kawasaki Motors Corp. v. H-D Mich., Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1521, 1522
(T.T.A.B. 1997); see also Honda Gikenogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. H-D Mich.
Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1526 (T.T.A.B. 1997) (Harley Davidson abandoned the
application before a decision was issued).
18. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 205.
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Comparing the quack of feuding duck-boat operators with the quack of
the AFLAC duck is illustrative.19 “Duck” boats are amphibious vehicles de-
veloped during World War II. Some of these vehicles are still in use, but
rather than conveying soldiers, they now convey tourists. In one case Ride
the Ducks provided duck calls to their guides and customers to use during
tours, and registered the sound of the duck calls for “tour guide services over
land and water by amphibious vehicles.”20 Ride the Ducks sued its competi-
tor, Duck Boat Tours, to stop them from also providing duck calls to their
guides and customers.21 The court analyzed whether Ride the Ducks was
required to show proof of secondary meaning.22 If the “quack” of the duck
call was a “unique, different, or distinctive” sound, then it was inherently
distinctive and could be protected without proof of secondary meaning.23 If
the sound was “commonplace,” then it could only be protected if Ride the
Ducks was able to show that it had developed secondary meaning.24 In this
instance, the court found that the duck call sound was commonplace.25 And
because Ride the Ducks failed to establish that the sound had acquired secon-
dary meaning, Ride the Ducks could not prevent Duck Boat Tours from also
using the duck calls.26
Unlike the commonplace “quack” of Ride the Ducks, the quack of the
AFLAC duck was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office without proof of
secondary meaning.27 The difference being that an actual duck will never
utter the AFLAC duck quack. The AFLAC quack sounds like the word
“AFLAC” pronounced by a person with a terribly sore throat.28 It is a unique,
different, or distinctive sound, and is therefore inherently distinctive and pro-
tectable without proof of secondary meaning.29
19. See Ride the Ducks, L.L.C. v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-CV-5595,
2005 WL 670302 (E.D. Pa. 2005), reh’g denied, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8162
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2005), aff’d, 138 Fed. Appx. 431 (3d Cir. 2005).
20. The mark consists of a quacking noise made by tour guides and tour partici-
pants by use of duck call devices throughout various portions of the tours,
Registration No. 2484276.
21. See Ride the Ducks, 2005 WL 670302, at 1269.





27. The mark consists of the sound of a duck quacking the word “AFLAC,” Regis-
tration No. 2607415.
28. See Ride the Ducks, 2005 WL 670302, at 1274 (U.S. Trademark Reg. No.
2607415 is owned by American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus
(AFLAC)).
29. See id.
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IV. ESTABLISHING SECONDARY MEANING FOR
NON-CONVENTIONAL MARKS
As discussed above, establishing secondary meaning is often critical for
protecting non-conventional marks. Certain signs (i.e. colors and product
shapes) cannot be protected without proof of secondary meaning, and other
types of non-conventional signs are likely to require proof of secondary
meaning. The Lanham Trademark Act expressly provides for registration of a
mark that has acquired distinctiveness and permits (but does not require) the
Trademark Office to accept substantially exclusive and continuous use for at
least five years as proof of secondary meaning.30 In practice, the Trademark
Office only accepts substantially exclusive and continuous use for five years
as sufficient when the mark is not highly descriptive. Highly descriptive con-
ventional marks and certain categories of non-conventional marks (product
design, color, and sounds made by a product during normal operation) re-
quire further proof of secondary meaning.31 The further proof could be a
long-term use in commerce, extensive advertising expenditures, declarations
establishing recognition of the sign as a source indicator, or market research
and survey evidence.32
While the same types of evidence may be used to show secondary
meaning for conventional and non-conventional marks, proving secondary
meaning for non-conventional marks may prove more difficult. As a concep-
tual matter, “secondary meaning” is achieved when purchasers view the sign
as an indication of source; that is, when consumers recognize the sign as a
trademark.33 Conventional signs consisting of visual letters, numbers, and
symbols have been used for thousands of years. Consumers that encounter a
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive conventional sign used in a conventional
way (Xerox, Apple, Mustang) will be inclined to immediately view the sign
as a mark. Consumers that encounter a descriptive sign used in a conven-
tional way (National Car Rental) will naturally view the sign as a mark when
they begin associating the sign with the goods or services. In contrast, con-
sumers encountering a non-conventional sign must first accept that it is pos-
sible for the non-conventional sign to function as a mark and, second,
actually view the sign as indicating the source of the goods or services.
As certain categories of non-conventional signs become more common,
consumers will be more likely to recognize them as marks. For example, the
proliferation of sound marks and their relatively long history compared to
other non-conventional marks arguably means that consumers are more
30. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012).
31. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.05(a) (2017).
32. Id. § 1212.06.
33. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 253 (1995).
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likely to recognize new sound marks.34 Either the Trademark Office or courts
may require less proof of secondary meaning or proof may become easier to
acquire. Signs that are highly non-conventional with less consumer history,
such as scent marks and texture marks, arguably will require more evidence
of secondary meaning to establish trademark rights. Indeed, consumers’ ac-
ceptance of non-conventional marks, and the level of proof for secondary
meaning required to establish trademark use, may vary not only with the type
of mark, but also with geography.
Consumers in countries where the use and protection of non-conven-
tional marks was previously prohibited or is simply less well-established may
be less likely to view a non-conventional sign as a distinctive mark indicating
the source of the goods or services. Stronger proof of secondary meaning
may be required in this situation, compared to where consumers have grown
used to such non-conventional marks. As goods and services cross from one
country to another, their trademarks cross along with them. Trademark own-
ers must of course consider whether the laws of a particular country allow
protection of the mark. Assuming protection is legally available, owners are
wise to also consider the levels and types of proof necessary to show that a
sign functions as a mark for particular consumers where they are located,
taking into account their familiarity with non-conventional marks.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of conventional marks goes back thousands of years. While
non-conventional marks are not so ancient, they are likely to become increas-
ingly important as the pace of global trade increases. Companies seeking to
stand out from the crowd of competitors may more often turn to non-conven-
tional marks. As the use of non-conventional marks grows, consumers
around the world will more readily recognize and accept non-conventional
marks. Nevertheless, the analysis of which non-conventional signs may func-
tion as marks and whether those signs actually do function as marks will
remain an intensely local question.
34. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer registered its “lion roaring” sound mark in 1986 claim-
ing use since 1924. The mark comprises a lion roaring. METRO-GOLDWYN-
MAYER, Registration. No. 1395550. NBC registered its “chimes” sound mark
in 1971 claiming use since 1961. The mark comprises a sequence of chime-like
musical notes which are in the key of C and sound the notes G, E, C—the “G”
being the one just below middle C, the “E” the one just above middle C, and
the “C” being middle C—thereby to identify applicant’s broadcasting service.
NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, Registration. No. 0916522. Trademark
“Sound Mark” Examples, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/sound
marks/trademark-sound-mark-examples (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (for other
registered sound marks).
